Wednesday, March 27, 2013

买者小心(Caveat emptor),请特别小心“便宜”律师


我们经常听到“律师是骗子”这类的评论。

第一:我不同意这样的评论,因为如果这个结论是真实的,美国就不会有公正。这和美国基本上是一个公正社会的事实是相违背的。

问题是,很多华裔找律师的时候,方法有问题。问题其一就是找便宜的律师。

下面的故事,就是这样一个例子。律师的中文名字是李晓升,英文名字James H. Li。(英文是律协起诉李晓升的原文。)

律协用了两个事件起诉李晓升。在第一个事件里,李晓升以4万元受理了一个案子,他保证成功代理王先生,如果不成功,他会把3万元还给王先生。王先生同意让李晓升代理他的案子。当李晓升把案子输了以后,拒绝把3万元还给王先生。在第二个事件里,李晓升开始以每小时$100代理崔先生,很快地把费用涨到每小时$650,榨干了崔先生。

第二:在美国是有正义的。

李晓升在很多年里,对华人胡作非为。他所有的招数,一开始都是以低价招揽客户。

凡事不是不报,只是时候未到。到了最后,加州律协正式起诉李晓升,为那些受害的客户伸张正义。

经验教训:找律师的时候,应该小心,否则,就会找到有问题的律师。如果一个人专门想找便宜的律师,那就会找到李晓升这样的律师。

几千年前,古罗马就有一句话,叫做“买者小心”(即Caveat emptor)。如果一个人找律师,一味找最便宜的,很难不找上那些“对症下药”的,诸如李晓升之流的律师。

下面是英文是律协起诉李晓升的原文:


1. James H. Li ("Respondent") was admitted to the practice of law in the State of California on June 12, 1995, was a member at all times pertinent to these charges, and is currently a member of the State Bar of California.

2. Respondent willfully violated Business and Professions Code, section 6106, by committing an act involving moral turpitude, dishonesty or corruption, as follows:

3. On or about August 2, 2007, Ching Wang ("Wang") employed Respondent to represent him in the case entitled Silvia Hu v. Ching Wang, San Bernardino County Superior Court Case No. RCV090876 ("the Wang II case"). On or about August 2, 2007, Respondent an( Wang entered into a retainer agreement for a $2,000 "non-refundable retainer," and agreed that he would be billed at an hourly rate of $100 per hour. Wang paid the Respondent $2,000.

4. On or about August 5, 2007, Respondent proposed entering into an amended retainer agreement, which amended the initial retainer agreement. The amended retainer agreement required Wang to pay an additional $10,000 as a "non-refundable retainer," and an additional $30,000 in advanced fees. In the amended retainer agreement, Respondent provided Wang with a "guarantee" that he would receive a "favorable result" for Wang and the named defendants, which he defined as: "(1) a judgment or verdict in favor of all defendants, (2) a dismissal with or without prejudice of the case in favor of all defendants, or (3) a resolution of the case in the way that Clients choose to accept." Respondent guaranteed to refund the $30,000 in advanced fees if he did not receive a favorable result for Wang and the other named defendants. Wang and Respondent entered into the amended retainer agreement and Wang paid Respondent the additional $40,000.

5. On or about February 4, 2008, a judgment was entered in favor of Sylvia Hu and against Wang in the Wang II case.

6. In or about February 2008, Wang demanded refund of the $30,000.

7. On or about February 6, 2008, Respondent sent an email to Wang stating that his "guarantee" set forth in the amended retainer agreement was "void" because Wang did not cooperate with him. Li did not refund the $30,000 to Wang and Li’s claim that the retainer agreement was "void" was untenable.

8. On or about February 13, 2008, Wang terminated Respondent. Respondent continuec to refuse to refund the $30,000 to Wang and has not refunded the $30,000 to date.

9. On or about January 7, 2009, Wang filed a lawsuit against Respondent entitled Ching Wang, et al. v. James Hsiaosheng LL et al., Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. KC054638  ("the fraud case") for breach of contract, fraud and legal malpractice, among other theories. Wang sought, among other things, damages and the imposition of a constructive trust for the return of the $30,000. Respondent continued to refuse to refund the $30,000 and has continued to refuse to refund the $30,000 to date.

10. The court scheduled the fraud case for a jury trial which was set to begin on May 4, 2011 and Respondent had notice of the trial date. On or about May 4, 2011, Respondent appeared at the trial representing himself and attorney Sally Chan ("Chan") appeared on behalf of Wang. The court advised the parties the trial would begin the next day on May 5, 2011, with a trial estimate of two-to-three weeks, and that a jury panel of approximately 50 prospective urors would be present so that the parties could begin picking a jury.

11. On or about May 5,2011, knowing the trial was to begin that same morning, filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case on his own behalf in the case entitled In Re James Li, U.S. Bankruptcy Court (Central District) Case No. 8:11-bk-16426. Respondent filed the bankruptcy proceeding with the improper purpose of staying the fraud trial. The court did in fact continue the trial in the fraud action, but issued an order to show cause for June 26, 2011, as to why the trial should not go forward, after Chan advised the court that Respondent had filed the bankruptcy petition without any of the required schedules.

12. On or about May 16, 2011, and after having delayed the fraud trial, Li dismissed his bankruptcy case.

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13. By filing a bankruptcy case on May 5,2011 for the purpose of delaying the fraud trial, and by maintaining the untenable legal position that the guarantee in the amended retainer agreement he drafted is now void as against Wang, and by refusing to refund the $30,000 to Wang despite his written promise to do so, Respondent committed an act involving moral turpitude, dishonesty or corruption.

14. Respondent willfully violated Business and Professions Code, section 6068(g), by encouraging either the commencement or the continuance of an action or proceeding from any corrupt motive of passion or interest, as follows:

15. The allegations of Count(s) One are incorporated by reference.

16. By filing a bankruptcy case on May 5, 2011 for the purpose of delaying the fraud trial, Respondent encouraged either the commencement or the continuance of an action or proceeding from any corrupt motive of passion or interest.

17. Respondent willfully violated Business and Professions Code, section 6068(c), by failing to counsel or maintain such action, proceedings, or defenses only as appear to him legal or just, as follows:

18. The allegations of Count(s) One are incorporated by reference.

19. By filing a bankruptcy case on May 5, 2011 for the purpose of delaying the fraud trial, Respondent failed to counsel or maintain such action, proceedings, or defenses only as appear to him legal or just.

20. Respondent willfully violated Business and Professions Code, section 6068(a), by failing to support the Constitution and laws of the United States and of this state, as follows:

21. The allegations of Count(s) One are incorporated by reference.

22. Respondent violated 11 U.S.C, section 707(b) by filing his Chapter 7 bankruptcy for an improper purpose.

23. By violating 11 U.S.C, section 707(b) when he filed his Chapter 7 bankruptcy petitiol for the improper purpose of delaying the fraud case, Respondent failed to support the Constitution and laws of the United States and of this state.

24. Respondent willfully violated Business and Professions Code, section 6068(d), by employing, for the purposes of maintaining the causes confided in him, means which are inconsistent with truth, as follows:

25. The allegations of Count(s) One are incorporated by reference.

26. On or about May 5, 2011, when he filed his Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition, Respondent executed the required form, "Exhibit D- Individual Debtor’s Statement of Compliance with Credit Counseling Requirement" to his Bankruptcy Petition under penalty of perjury falsely representing that he had complied with the requirement within 180 days of filing bankruptcy. Specifically, Respondent checked box 2 on the form, which stated in pertinent part, "Within the 180 days before the filing of my bankruptcy case, I received a briefing from a credit counseling agency approved by the United States trustee or bankruptcy administrator that outlined the opportunities for available credit counseling and assisted me in performing a related budget analysis, but I do not have a certificate from the agency describing the services provided to me." Respondent executed the form under penalty of perjury. Respondent knew at the time he executed the form that he had not completed the credit counseling requirement prior to filing his bankruptcy petition.

27. On or about May 5,2011, Respondentfalsely stated in his Chapter 7 bankruptcy penalty of perjury that he estimated his assets to be "between $0 to $50,000," when he knew his estimated assets exceeded $370,000.

28. By falsely representing on "Exhibit D- Individual Debtor’s Statement of Compliance with Credit Counseling Requirement" to his bankruptcy petition that he had completed the requisite credit counseling requirement prior to filing for bankruptcy when he knew he had not done so, and by falsely estimating his assets exceeded $370,000, Respondent employed, for the purposes of maintaining the causes confided in him, means which are inconsistent with truth.

29. Respondent willfully violated Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3-700(D)(2), by failing to refund promptly any part of a fee paid in advance that has not been earned, as follows:

30. The allegations of Count(s) One are incorporated by reference.

31. On or about October 17, 2011, the jury entered a verdict in the fraud case in favor of Wang and against Li for fraud, breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation, conversion, breach of fiduciary duty and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The jury awarded damages against Respondent and in favor of Wang for the entire $30,000

32. On or about January 5, 2012, the court entered an amended judgment against Respondent in the fraud case for $44,000 in general damages and $44,000 in punitive damages. To date, Respondent has not paid the judgment.

33. By the express terms of his own "guarantee" contained in the amended retainer agreement, Respondent has not earned at least $30,000 of the fees paid to him by Wang, and Respondent has owed Wang a refund since on or about February 4, 2008, irrespective of the fraud judgment and Wang should not have had to file suit or obtain a judgment against Respondent to recover these unearned fees.

34. By failing to refund the $30,000 in unearned fees at any time between February 4, 2008 and the present, Respondent failed to promptly refund unearned fees.

35. Respondent willfully violated Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 4-100(A), by failing to deposit funds received for the benefit of a client in a bank account labeled "Trust Account," "Client’s Funds Account" or words of similar import, as follows:

36. The allegations of Count(s) One are incorporated by reference.

37. Respondent did not immediately deposit the $30,000 in funds into a bank account labeled "Trust Account," "Client’s Funds Account" or words of similar import after having been made aware in or about February 2008 when he learned that Wang was disputing Respondent’s retention of the $30,000 as attorney’s fe~s. Only on or about October 25,2011, and only after Respondent had been found liable to Wang for breach of contract and fraud, did Respondent deposit the $30,000 into his Bank of America client trust account no. xxxxx-x18911

38. By failing to deposit the $30,000 into his CTA at any time between February 2008 and October 25, 2011, Respondent failed to deposit funds received for the benefit of a client in a bank account labeled "Trust Account," "Client’s Funds Account" or words of similar import.

39. By failing to deposit the $30,000 in fees into a client trust account at any time from February 4, 2008 when he learned Wang was disputing his right to retain the funds as fees until October 25, 2011, Respondent failed to deposit disputed funds into a client trust account.

40. Respondent willfully violated Business and Professions Code, section 6106, by committing an act involving moral turpitude, dishonesty or corruption, as follows: Only the last four digits of the account are listed to protect the account.

41. On or about April 25, 2007, Michael Chui ("Chui") was sued by his sister Cindy Tsui ("Tsui") in Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. GC038906 ("the lawsuit") involving a dispute over the ownership of real property located at 9333 Guess Street, in the City of Rosemead, the County of Los Angeles and the State of California ("the real property").

42. On or about August 27, 2007, Chui hired Respondent to defend him in the lawsuit. Pursuant to the fee agreement, Respondent agreed to charge Chui an hourly fee of $100 per hour. Chui selected Respondent to represent him because of Respondent’s low fees and because Respondent is fluent in Chinese (Cantonese), which is Chui’s primary language. Respondent provided Chui with a written retainer agreement, which Chui signed, which was in English and not in Chinese. The fee agreement did not expressly reserve the right for Respondent to increase his $100 hourly rate.

43. In or about January 2008, Respondent increased his hourly fee from $100 per hour to $110 per hour for the first 30 hours of work during 2008, and then he increased his hourly fee to $250 per hour.

44. Between on or about August 24, 2007 and on or about September 23, 2008, Chui paid Respondent with cash, checks and credit cards totaling $57,000, until he had no more money. At that time, Respondent knew Chui was vulnerable and that he could not afford to retain new counsel to represent him in the lawsuit.

45. In or about September 2008, Respondent, knowing Chui had an equity ownership interest in the real property, approached Chui about signing deeds of trust and promissory notes against his interest in the real property as security for past due and future attorney’s fees owed to Respondent.

46. Between on or about December 2, 2008 and on or about December 23, 2009, Respondent provided Chui with five deeds of trust and five promissory notes permitting Respondent to acquire a security interest again Chui’s portion of the real property in the amount of $170,000.

47. On or about December 2, 2008, Chui signed a Deed of Trust with Assignment of Rents as Additional Security in favor of Respondent for a $30,000 interest in Chui’s property. The deed of trust, which was signed by Chui, was written in English and Respondent did not a copy of the deed of trust in Chinese.

48. On or about December 4, 2008, Chui signed a promissory note for the $30,000 deed of trust executed on or about December 2, 2008. The promissory note provided that Chui pay interest at 13% per annum on the principal balance, which amounted to a usurious rate ofinteres! to California Constitution, Article XV § 1, which limits the rate of interest to 10%. The r note, which Chui executed, was in English and Respondent did not provide Chui with a written translation of the promissory note in Chinese. The promissory note did contain the following statement in English, which Chui initialed: "The undersigned also acknowledge (sic) that it (sic) has been advised to seek independent counsel to review this document as well as the associated DEED OF TRUST WITH ASSIGNMENT OF RENTS AS ADDITIONAL SECURITY, and has been given a reasonable opportunity, 20 days, to seek such counsel." Chui did not sign any document in Chinese consenting in writing to the transaction and he did not sign any document in Chinese acknowledging that he had been advised to seek independent counsel to review the promissory note and deed of trust.

49. On or about June 23, 2009, Chui signed a Deed of Trust with Assignment of Rents as Additional Security in favor of Respondent for a $30,000 interest in Chui’s property. The deed of trust, which was signed by Chui, was written in English and Respondent did not provide a copy of the deed of trust in Chinese. The deed of trust referenced a corresponding promissory note dated June 2, 2009, but no such promissory note exists.

50. In or about July 2009, unbeknownst to Chui, Respondent assigned his rights to receive $50,000 from the deeds of trust against Chui’s property to his sister Po Shan Li

51. On or about August 3, 2009, Chui signed a promissory note for $301000, but the corresponding deed of trust is not identified in the promissory note. The promissory note provided that Chui pay interest at 13% per annum on the principal balance, which amounted to a usurious rate of interest pursuant to California Constitution, Article XV § 1, which limits the rate of interest to 10%. The promissory note, which Chui executed, was in English and Respondent did not provide Chui with a written translation of the documents in Chinese. The promissory note did contain the following statement in English, which Chui initialed: "The undersigned also acknowledge(sic) that it (sic) has been advised to seek independent counsel to review this document as well as the associated DEED OF TRUST WITH ASSIGNMENT OF RENTS AS ADDITIONAL SECURITY, and has been given a reasonable opportunity, 20 days, to seek such counsel." Chui did not sign any document in Chinese consenting in writing to the transaction and he did not sign any document in Chinese acknowledging that he had been advised to seek independent counsel to review the promissory note and deed of trust.

52. On or about September 8, 2009, Chui signed a Deed of Trust with Assignment of Rents as Additional Security in favor of Respondent for a $60,000 interest in Chui’s property. The deed of trust, which was signed by Chui, was written in English and Respondent did not provide a copy of the deed of trust in Chinese.

53. On or about September 8, 2009, Chui signed a promissory note for the $60,000 deed of trust executed on or about September 8, 2009. The promissory note provided that Chui pay interest at 17% per annum on the principal balance, which amounted to a usurious rate of interesl pursuant to California Constitution, Article XV § 1, which limits the rate of interest to 10%. The promissory note, which Chui executed was in English and Respondent did not provide Chui with a written translation of the documents in Chinese. The promissory note did contain the followin~ statement in English, which Chui initialed: "The undersigned also acknowledge (sic) that it (sic) has been advised to seek independent counsel to review this document as well as the associated DEED OF TRUST WITH ASSIGNMENT OF RENTS AS ADDITIONAL SECURITY, and has been given a reasonable opportunity, 20 days, to seek such counsel." Chui did not sign any document in Chinese consenting in writing to the transaction and he did not sign any document in Chinese acknowledging that he had been advised to seek independent counsel to review the promissory note and deed of trust.

54. On or about December 23, 2009, Chui signed a Deed of Trust with Assignment of Rents as Additional Security in favor of Respondent for a $25,000 interest in Chui’s property. The deed of trust, which was signed by Chui, was written in English and Respondent did not provide a copy of the deed of trust in Chinese.

55. On or about December 23, 2009, Chui signed a promissory note for the $25,000 deed of trust executed on or about December 23, 2009. The promissory note provided that Chui pay interest at 17% per annum on the principal balance, which amounted to a usurious rate of interest pursuant to California Constitution, Article XV § 1, which limits the rate of interest to 10%. The promissory note, which Chui executed was in English and Respondent did not provide Chui with a written translation of the documents in Chinese. The promissory note did contain the following statement in English, which Chui initialed: "The undersigned also acknowledge (sic) that it (sic) has been advised to seek independent counsel to review this document as well as the associated DEED OF TRUST WITH ASSIGNMENT OF RENTS AS ADDITIONAL SECURITY, and has been given a reasonable opportunity, 20 days, to seek such counsel." Chui did not sign any document in Chinese consenting in writing to the transaction and he did not sign any document in Chinese acknowledging that he had been advised to seek independent counsel to review the promissory note and deed of trust.

56. On or about December 23, 2009, Chui signed a second Deed of Trust with Assignment of Rents as Additional Security in favor of Respondent for a $25,000 interest in Chui’s property. The deed of trust, which was signed by Chui, was written in English and Respondent did not provide a copy of the deed of trust in Chinese.

57. On or about December 23, 2009, Chui signed a second promissory note for the $25,000 second deed of trust executed on or about December 23, 2009. The promissory note provided that Chui pay interest at 17% per annum on the principal balance, which amounted to a usurious rate of interest pursuant to California Constitution, Article XV § 1, which limits the rate of interest to 10%. The promissory note, which Chui executed was in English and Respondent did not provide Chui with a written translation of the documents in Chinese. The promissory note did contain the following statement in English, which Chui initialed: "The undersigned alsc acknowledge (sic) that it (sic) has been advised to seek independent counsel to review this document as well as the associated DEED OF TRUST WITH ASSIGNMENT OF RENTS AS ADDITIONAL SECURITY, and has been given a reasonable opportunity, 20 days, to seek such counsel." Chui did not sign any document in Chinese consenting in writing to the transaction and he did not sign any document in Chinese acknowledging that he had been advised to seek independent counsel to review the promissory note and deed of trust.

58. On or about March 14, 2010, Respondent commissioned an appraisal on the real property, which was appraised as having a value of $375,000. At all relevant times while he was billing Chui for legal services during the pendency of the lawsuit, Respondent knew or should have known that the value of the real property was approximately $375,000, and that if the property was partitioned, Chui’s equity in the real property would be no more than half, less any bills and expenses to be paid.

59. In or about April 2010, unbeknownst to Chui, Respondent assigned his rights to receive $90,000 from the deeds of trust against Chui’s property to his sister Po Shan Li.

60. In or about June 2010, Respondent submitted a bill to Chui showing a balance due of $156,974 and Respondent had increased his hourly billing rate to $350 per hour.

61. In or about July 2010, Respondent notified Chui orally and in writing that he was going to be charging him $650 per hour because the amount secured by the five deeds of trust had been exhausted.

62. The trial in the lawsuit took place on or about August 3, 4, 5, and 16, 2010.

63. On or about September 17, 2010, the court issued its Final Statement of Decision ordering partition of the property by sale, and made certain findings as to the distribution of the proceeds, including a finding that, "All sums due to counsel for Chui to satisfy the deed of trust in favor of James Li, chargeable to the share of defendant Chui."

64. On or about September 17, 2010, Respondent filed a motion to withdraw from representing Chui in the lawsuit, which was scheduled for a hearing on October 12, 2012.

65. On or about September 20, 2010, Chui learned that Respondent had assigned $140,000 of his rights in the deeds of trust to his sister, Po Shan Li, and that Respondent would be representing both himself and Po Shan Li in an effort to collect money from Chui’s equity interest in the real property. Chui also learned that Respondent had filed a motion to withdraw from representing him in the lawsuit.

66. On or about September 29, 2010, and while Respondent was still the attorney of record for Chui, Respondent filed the motion to vacate judgment as the attorney on behalf of himself and his sister Po Shan Li. He listed himself and Po Shan Li as "Intervenors." On or about September 29, 2010, and while he was still the attorney of record for Chui, Respondent also filed a Notice of Pendency of Action for Vacating Judgment (Lis Pendens) on the real property on behalf of himself and Po Shan Li as "Aggrieved Persons."

67. On or about October 6, 2010, the court issued judgment in favor of Tsui and against Chui and incorporated the Final Statement of Decision as follows: the court ordered partition of the property by sale, and made certain findings as to the distribution of the proceeds, including a finding that, "All sums due to counsel for Chui to satisfy the deed of trust in favor of James Li, chargeable to the share of defendant Chui."

68. On or about October 18, 2010, after Chui secured new counsel, George Young ("Young") and Steven Sugars ("Sugars"), Young and Sugars sent a substitution of attorney to Respondent and directed him to sign the substitution of attorney form and stop all work on behal of Chui.

69. In or about October 2010, Respondent submitted a bill to Chui showing a balance due of $246,055.10 and Respondent had increased his hourly billing rate to $650 per hour.

70. To date, Respondent has continued to attempt to collect his fees from Chui’s equity interest in the real property and he has continued to assert that he and Po Shan Li have deeds of trust for $170,000 as against the real property.

71. By repeatedly increasing his hourly fees from $100 to $650 when he knew his client had exhausted all of his funds in paying him $57,000 and had no means to hire other counsel, by securing five deeds of trust totaling $170,000 against Chui’s equity interest in the real property, and by increasing his hourly fee from $350 to $650 one month before the trial date, Respondent committed an act involving moral turpitude, dishonesty or corruption.

72. Respondent willfully violated Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 4-200(A), by entering into an agreement for, charging, or collecting an unconscionable fee, as follows:

73. The allegations of Count(s) Eight are incorporated by reference.

74. The amount of the October 2010 bill showing a balance due of $246,055.10, in addition to the $57,000 previously paid to Respondent by Chui was disproportionate to the value of the services Respondent provided to Chui.

75. Respondent’s level of sophistication, experience, reputation and ability did not justify an hourly fee of $650.

76. Chui was a vulnerable client whose primary language is Chinese (Cantonese).

77. If Respondent were to collect the $170,000 based on the promissory notes and trust deeds he required Chui to sign, all of Chui’s equity interest in the real property would be exhausted on Respondent’s fees, which far exceed any equity interest Chui has in the property.

78. By charging Chui usurious rated of interest on each of the promissory notes ranging from 13% to 17%, by advising Chui in July 2010 that he would be billing him at an hourly rate of $650, and by sending his client a bill in or about October 2010 showing a balance due of $246,055.10 after having already billed Chui $57,000 in a case where Respondent knew or should have known the property was worth approximately $375,000, Respondent entered into an agreement for, charged, and collected an unconscionable fee.

79. Respondent willfully violated Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 4-200(A), by entering into an agreement for, charging, or collecting an illegal fee, as follows:

80. The allegations of Count(s) Eight are incorporated by reference.

81. By entering into the five promissory notes whereby Respondent contracted to charge Chui between 13% and 17% interest in violation of California’s usury law, Respondent entered into an agreement for, charging, or collecting an illegal fee.

82. Respondent willfully violated Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3-300, by knowingly acquiring a security adverse to a client without complying with the requirements that the transaction or acquisition and its terms were fair and reasonable to the client, that the transaction or acquisition and its terms were fully disclosed and transmitted in writing to the client in a manner which should reasonably have been understood by the client, that the client was advised in writing that the client may seek the advice of an independent lawyer of the client’s choice, that the client was given a reasonable opportunity to seek that advice, and that th~ client thereafter consented in writing to the terms of the transaction or acquisition, as follows:

83. The allegations of Count(s) Eight are incorporated by reference.

84. When Respondent had Chui execute each of the five promissory notes secured by the five deeds of trust, the transactions were not fair and reasonable as Respondent was seeking a security interest in the real property which was the subject of the litigation in which he was defending Chui and Respondent sought to charge Chui usurious rates of interest ranging from 13% to 17% for each of the promissory notes. The transactions were also not fair and reasonable because Respondent sought to use the five promissory notes secured by the five deeds of trust to charge Chui an additional $170,000 in attorney’s fees, in addition to the $57,000 in attorney’s fees he had previously charged Chui, in a case where the subject real property to be partitioned was only worth approximately $375,000, less any other debts, liabilities or encumbrances. The five promissory notes secured by the five deeds of trust enable Respondent and Po Shan Li to take all of Chui’s remaining equity in the real property and to foreclose on the real property.

85. When Respondent had Chui execute each of the five promissory notes secured by the five deeds of trust, the transactions and its terms were not fully disclosed and transmitted in writing to the client in a manner which should reasonably have been understood by the client because Respondent did not provide written translations of the five deeds of trust and five promissory notes to Chui in Chinese.

86. Respondent did not advise Chui in writing in his primary language of Chinese of his right to seek the advice of an independent lawyer of his choice before he executed each of the deeds of trust and promissory notes.

87. Chui did not consent in writing in Chinese to the terms each of the five transactions a~ the time he executed each of the five deeds of trust and five promissory notes. Chui did not sign any acknowledgment in writing in Chinese of his right to seek the advice of an independent lawyer before executing each of the deeds of trust and promissory notes.

88. By entering into each of the five promissory notes secured by the five deeds of trust with Chui without advising Chui in writing in his primary language of Chinese that he may seek the advice of an independent lawyer before signing the deeds of trust and promissory notes, by not obtaining Chui’s written acknowledgement in Chinese of his right to seek the advice of an independent lawyer before executing the deeds of trust and promissory notes, and by failing to explain to Chui that his execution of the five promissory notes and five deeds of trust would permit Respondent foreclose on the real property or take all of Chui’s equity in the real property which was the subject of the litigation in which he was defending Chui, Respondent knowingly acquired an interest adverse to a client without complying with the requirements that the transaction or acquisition and its terms were fair and reasonable to the client, that the transaction or acquisition and its terms were fully disclosed and transmitted in writing to the client in a manner which should reasonably have been understood by the client, that the client was advised in writing that the client may seek the advice of an independent lawyer of the client’s choice, that the client was given a reasonable opportunity to seek that advice, and that the client thereafter consented in writing to the terms of the transaction or acquisition.

89. Respondent willfully violated Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3-310(C)(2), by accepting or continuing representation of more than one client in a matter in which the interests of the clients actually conflicted without the informed written consent of each client, as follows:

90. The allegations of Count(s) Eight are incorporated by reference.

91. Chui, Respondent and Po Shan Li had competing and conflicting interests in Chui’s equity interest in the real property.

92. By filing a motion to vacate the judgment on behalf of himself and his sister Po Shan Li while he was still the attorney of record for Chui, by filing a lis pendens on behalf of himself and Po Shan Li against the real property while he was still the attorney of record for Chui, by continuing efforts to collect the $170,000 against Chui on behalf of himself and Po Shan Li while he was still the attorney of record for Chui, and by continuing to represent Po Shan Li in efforts to collect money from Chui, Respondent accepted or continued representation of more than one client in a matter in which the interests of the clients actually conflicted without the informed written consent of each client.

93. Respondent willfully violated Business and Professions Code, section 6068(a), by failing to support the Constitution and laws of the United States and of this state, as follows:

94. The allegations of Count(s) Eight are incorporated by reference.

95. Respondent owed a common law duty of loyalty to Chui while he was his attorney of record in the lawsuit.

96. By breaching his common law duty of loyalty to Chui by filing a motion to vacate the judgment on behalf of himself and his sister Po Shan Li while he was still the attorney of record for Chui, filing a lis pendens on behalf of himself and Po Shan Li against the real property while he was still the attorney of record for Chui, and continuing efforts to collect the $170,000 against Chui on behalf of himself and Po Shan Li while he was still the attorney of record for Chui, and by continuing to represent Po Shan Li in efforts to collect money from Chui Respondent failed to support the Constitution and laws of the United States and of this state.

起诉书原文:http://www.pujielaw.com/Doc/StateBar_v_JamesLi.pdf

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